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VOLUNTARISM, VULNERABILITY, AND CRIMINAL LAW:
A RESPONSE TO PROFESSORS HILLS AND O'HEAR
ETHAN J. LEIB,* DAN MARKEL,N AND JENNIFER M. COLLINS**
We are grateful to Boston University Law Review for publishing this mini-
symposium on our work and to Professors Hills and O'Hear for their careful
and subtle analysis of our recent scholarship.' In this Response, we clarify a
few features of our argument that we think highlight how little disagreement
with our interlocutors exists on three very central issues. While some
differences persist, we hope our Response narrows the gap between our
positions and those of Professors Hills and O'Hear.2
Before addressing specific criticisms, it is worth recapitulating what our
bottom-line conclusions are so we can better see if there are any practical
disagreements with our critics. Summarizing quickly: we support
decriminalization in the cases of parental responsibility laws (based on strict
and vicarious liability), bigamy, adultery, and nonpayment of parental support;
we endorse decriminalizing incest between most adults, though we are divided
on certain sub-issues in the incest context; and we are highly skeptical of
criminalization in the nonpayment of child support context, but concede that
more research needs to be done on just how effective criminalization is in
achieving compliance. The only area in which we are largely unconflicted
about criminalization is the omissions (failure to rescue) context - and that is
where our critics primarily aim their critiques.
This Response focuses on three general points; most of the discussion of
those general points comes up in the context of disagreement over the scope
and rationale for omissions liability. We begin by explaining how Professors
Hills and O'Hear tend to overstate our commitment to voluntariness as a basis
* Associate Professor of Law, University of California - Hastings College of the Law.
Assistant Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law.
Associate Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law.
Jennifer M. Collins, Ethan J. Leib & Dan Markel, Punishing Family Status, 88 B.U. L.
REV. 1327 (2008); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Do Families Need Special Rules of Criminal
Law?: A Reply to Professors Collins, Leib, and Markel, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1425 (2008);
Michael M. O'Hear, Yes to Nondiscrimination, No to New Forms of Criminal Liability: A
Reply to Professors Collins, Leib, and Markel, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1437 (2008).
2 We will try to make these points more clear in our book based on this work. See
generally DAN MARKEL, JENNIFER M. COLLINS & ETHAN J. LEIB, PRIVILEGE OR PUNISH:
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forthcoming Apr. 2009).
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for allocating criminal law liability. Second, we address their concern
regarding the criminal law's ability to shape people's caregiving choices.
Third, we discuss what our commitment to criminal law minimalism requires
when it comes to designing family status burdens.
I. ON VOLUNTARINESS
In light of the replies of Professors Hills and O'Hear, we first wish to
address the role performed by voluntariness in our arguments. Professor
O'Hear suggests in his reply that we embrace the view that "the voluntary
assumption of a duty.., adds substantial support for the criminal enforcement
of that duty."' 3 Professor Hills likewise worries that we "root" criminal liability
in "consent" to provide care. 4 Although we think that voluntariness is relevant
in analyzing family ties burdens, the use of the phrase "substantial support"
overstates our position because voluntariness is not in and of itself a sufficient
reason to bring the criminal law to bear. Similarly, we resist the idea that we"root" liability in consent, since it is not itself the reason for liability; as we
explained, it is only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for criminal law
liability.5 In the omissions context, for example, it is the failure to perform
some underlying caregiving duty that remains the basis for the liability.
Voluntariness with respect to the assumption of that duty only plays a role in
delineating whose acts or omissions may properly serve as a basis for criminal
liability in a liberal state.
Professor O'Hear rightly emphasizes another role for voluntariness within
the criminal law: that a defendant's conduct must be voluntary. 6 But he seems
to conclude from this familiar principle of criminal law - in conjunction with
the well-known principle that ignorance of a violated norm is no excuse - that
voluntariness can serve no other role in allocating liability within the criminal
law system. 7 We disagree.
So what is our account of voluntariness, and how is it different from the
voluntariness associated with conduct or criminal acts that the criminal law
routinely focuses upon? In deriving our "voluntariness" test - one that asks
legislators to construct criminal law liability of the sort we see in "family ties
burdens" only upon satisfaction that parties actually have taken upon
themselves a voluntary duty in connection with a relationship of caregiving -
we looked at the actual imposition of these burdens through the criminal law
and saw the way in which criminal justice systems picked out familial
relationships for burdening. 8 In five of the seven family ties burdens we
explored - omissions liability, parental responsibility, bigamy, adultery, and
' O'Hear, supra note 1, at 1439.
4 Hills, supra note 1, at 1427.
Collins, Leib & Markel, supra note 1, at 1363-66.
6 See O'Hear, supra note 1, at 1439.
See id. at 1439-40.
8 See Collins, Leib & Markel, supra note 1, at 1334-49.
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nonpayment of child support - the liability only attached to a person who could
plausibly be said to have voluntarily created the relationship of caregiving. 9
Moreover, with respect to filial responsibility laws, we were struck by the near
complete lack of enforcement. 10
To be sure, this casual empiricism did not decide the matter for us. But it
did illuminate it for us. Professor Hills calls us Dworkinians for this theory-
building approach."' But the other part of being a good Dworkinian is going
beyond fit (which was admittedly imperfect and non-decisive for us, in any
case) and finding a way to put the law in its best normative light. Once we
reached this step of our argument, it became clear to us that voluntariness must
play a central role in assessing the fairness of allocating criminal law liability
in these contexts. That is, aside from fit, the pattern of voluntariness evidenced
by the family ties burdens we discovered was consistent with what we thought
a liberal state should do: give people some autonomy about entering
relationships before using the relationship status as an element of a crime.
This autonomy principle was being stifled by the use of traditional family
status since the laws in question excluded from coverage many people who
should be covered because of the nature of their caregiving roles in others'
lives, for example, gays, polys, committed un-marrieds, etc.
It is worth pausing for a moment here to realize that although this
conception of voluntariness does not have a large explicit role to play in most
areas of the criminal law, when the criminal law seeks to burden a relationship
with the use of a status-oriented approach, we think liberalism requires that
burdens created are ones that have been voluntarily assumed. When the law
requires that public officials provide the public their "honest services,"'1 2 that
is, to act as quasi-fiduciaries to the public, it is fair to do so in part because
they have not been forced into these jobs. Nonetheless, Professor O'Hear
would be right to highlight just how much of the criminal law ignores
voluntariness in the underlying norms of conduct and instead focuses on the
conduct itself.13  And Professor Hills would be right to highlight that
voluntariness alone is not sufficient to trigger liability in a whole host of cases
the law does not criminalize. 14 However, in the world of family status
liabilities that we have found, most of which are predicated on a relationship,
we think that being able to choose or reject the relationship is a necessary
requirement to have the law comply with our basic commitments to autonomy
specifically, and liberalism generally. 15
9 Id.
10 Id. at 1348-49.
11 See Hills, supra note 1, at 1429.
12 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006).
13 O'Hear, supra note 1, at 1439.
14 See Hills, supra note 1, at 1429.
15 We do not disagree with Professors Hills and O'Hear that even paradigmatic cases of
choice or consent in relationships - like the parent-child and spouse-spouse relationship -
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Of course, nothing about our commitments in the article have anything to
say about the constitution of moral life and the source of moral norms. We
simply take a position about the institutional design of criminal justice
practices in a liberal state. It may well be the case that our parents or siblings
have legitimate moral claims that stem from their relationships to us,
independent of choice. But the liberal state should avoid enforcing those
claims through the criminal law for all the reasons we specify in the article. In
short, voluntariness of the sort we have identified is a reasonable barrier for
legislators to consider when they are designing the enforcement mechanisms of
the criminal law to target relational obligations.
Spuming our embrace of a voluntariness requirement, Professor O'Hear
offers an alternative basis of liability premised upon vulnerability and
proximity.16 Presumably, this would entail an obligation of an older sibling to
rescue a younger sibling when possible, not to mention neighbors and co-
workers. 17 Would the same preconditions for liability operate outside the
context of duties to rescue? Professor O'Hear does not say. To our mind,
vulnerability and proximity are aspects that matter insofar as they are parts of a
voluntarily created relationship of caregiving. 18 But insofar as they serve to
leave us with line drawing problems in some individual cases. Id. at 1430; O'Hear, supra
note 1, at 1442. Since we think of our analysis as primarily targeted at legislators designing
these types of liabilities, we think Professors Hills's and O'Hear's arguments trying to
undermine the choice involved with being a parent are perfectly admissible to that audience.
Still, we continue to think that, difficulties notwithstanding, we can impute voluntariness to
the parent-child relationship in a world where access to birth control, abortion, and adoption
exist. Professor Hills may be right that there are implicit "normative goals that lead us so
easily to infer that consent exists" in these relationships, see Hills, supra note 1, at 1432, but
that does not vitiate our understanding of them as voluntary, nor does it undermine our
attribution of meaning and value to that voluntariness, complicated though that
voluntariness may be. See generally Ethan J. Leib, Responsibility and Social/Political
Choices About Choice, 25 LAW & PHIL. 453 (2006) (exploring the relationship between
choice and other normative commitments in assessing the use of choice as a basis for
ascribing responsibility). Moreover, whatever problems there are with imputing
voluntariness to parenthood, three of the seven burdens - omissions liability, bigamy, and
adultery - are implicated in the spousal context, where imputing voluntariness is generally
less troublesome.
16 O'Hear, supra note 1, at 1443.
17 By rejecting unilateral voluntariness, it is unclear whether Professor O'Hear would
also forbid bilateral exchanges that conventionally create omissions liability, such as when
X hires Y to be his private nurse. There is also an irony here: O'Hear gives us a hard time
for purportedly expanding criminal law liability, see, e.g., id. at 1438-39, but it is his
alternative model of "vulnerability and proximity" without a voluntariness side-constraint
that might very well expand liabilities even further than our model.
18 For example, when children grow up, there might not be a basis for uncritically
extending these duties anymore, at least according to Professor Markel. But to Professors
Collins and Leib, there are some situations where the vulnerability persists, such as with
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create liability where no one consented to that caregiving obligation, we find
such status-based obligations problematic.1 9 Under our view of these duties to
rescue, without one party agreeing to perform some degree of caregiving, no
liability ought to attach. 20 So we do not disagree that Professor O'Hear's
normative foundations for these liabilities should also play a role in thinking
about when to exact them and from whom; it is just that we remain convinced
that the liberal state needs to assess some baseline voluntariness of the
relationship in the first instance. 2'
Instead of voluntariness or proximate vulnerability, Professor Hills offers a
different principle that, on his account, both fits and justifies a number of the
family ties burdens we reveal in the article. Hills would reorganize family ties
burdens to promote child-rearing. 22  We find that alternative deeply
troublesome for the liberal state.
incest. Yet, even in these cases, the voluntariness of the relationship still plays a role in
assessing whether it makes sense to criminalize status-based obligations.
19 Given the trade-offs, we seriously would entertain some open-mindedness toward a
general duty to perform costless rescues. We recognize that would violate our voluntariness
requirement, but a general duty to rescue would not use status-based characteristics to
impose criminal liability, one of our principal concerns in this project.
20 We put aside the standard cases in omissions liability where X creates the peril to Y or
where X waves Z off from rescuing Y. But one standard case, that of contract, does warrant
more emphasis. We were puzzled by Professor Hills's suggestion that the criminal law of
omissions treats families differently from contractually bound "providers of caregiving
services." Hills, supra note 1, at 1429. That is not a correct statement of the law, as we
discussed in Part I of our article. Collins, Leib & Markel, supra note 1, at 1335-38. If
someone hired a nurse or even a neighbor for the purpose of caregiving, that contract would
in fact be a sufficient basis for criminal liability in many jurisdictions if that person failed to
perform an easy rescue. Id. In some sense, that person is no different than X who waves Z
off from rescuing Y.
21 We acknowledge Professor O'Hear's concern that the opt-in registry discussed in the
article is unlikely to be widely used, especially among the lower socio-economic strata of
society. See O'Hear, supra note 1, at 1440 n.8, 1444. That, perhaps, shows a limit of the
registry. But the fact that not all poor gay couples may enjoy the ex ante benefit of a duty to
rescue via a registry is not itself a reason to deny that benefit to those poor gay couples who
do (or, more importantly, their children). Thus, something like the registry is still necessary
to avoid the facial discrimination and inequality that results without it. Moreover, we are
somewhat puzzled at why the registry would not provide sufficient information to
subscribing parties about their duties, as O'Hear laments. See id. at 1441. Signing up is
actually quite likely to force that information and would furnish the state with the
opportunity to instruct parties about their responsibilities. To be sure, O'Hear is more
concerned that the class of omissions liabilities that signing up would trigger is vague. But
that might just be another reason that a small number of people would sign up, and it would
give the government another reason to be less vague in delineating the duties and more
consistent in enforcing them.
22 Hills, supra note 1, at 1429-30.
1453
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Professor Hills makes a good case for the child-rearing value as a plausible
fit with some of the family ties burdens we discovered in the law.23 Each
burden in its own way can be part of a story in which the criminal justice
system brings itself to bear on families because families are subcontracted for
the task - without much oversight - of raising children for the state. As
Professor Hills acknowledges, this story is not a perfect fit; it is under-
inclusive in its failure to account for a whole host of primary caregivers who
are ignored by the laws and over-inclusive in that it captures all sorts of
relationships (spouse-spouse) even when there are no kids involved.24 But
then ours is also not a perfect fit.
Still, it is on the normative dimension that we are most skeptical of
Professor Hills's alternative. It does not suffice to say, as Professor Hills does,
that our society would be "deprived of the future value of humanity" without"properly raised children. '25 That may or may not be true. Indeed, if children
are a positive good, why do they become less valuable to society once they are
less vulnerable as adults? Presumably what makes children valuable is also
what makes adults valuable, in which case Professor Hills has a hard time
explaining why we would not extend the reach of these family liabilities to all,
or at least to those who still have procreative (and caregiving?) capacity. In
sum, we think a liberal state may not use its criminal law to reinforce a very
particular version of the right way to organize the institution of the family
through the use of status-based liabilities that citizens have never had the
opportunity to reject.
At times, it appears that Hills does not really disagree with us regarding the
need for an antidiscrimination norm in the context of liabilities. He too
pledges his commitment to the principles of nondiscrimination and would
presumably solve under-inclusiveness problems by doing just what we
recommend: expand liability to a larger class of caregivers for children (when
criminalization is necessary at all).26 Although Hills seems willing to come
along for the ride in bringing same-sex couples who raise children within the
definitions of "spouse" and "parent," he seems more reticent about bringing in
less traditionally organized (e.g., polyamorous) families or non-procreative
domestic unions into the fold.27 We have no such qualms of extending
23 Id.
24 Hills's claim that adultery prosecutions are much more likely when there are kids in
the picture, id. at 1433, was an interesting speculation, though we do not know of any
evidence suggesting that is true. Likewise, his theory would expect to find spousal
omissions prosecutions only in cases where there are kids to protect; but no evidence was
offered on that score either. Id.
25 Id. at 1431.
26 Id. at 1432-33.
27 See id. at 1428 n.14 (suggesting that one needs reliable data that polyamorous families
can effectively raise children before deeming their exclusion from family ties burdens
arbitrary). Here, we respectfully disagree with Professor Hills. So long as children in
polyamorous homes are vulnerable to their guardians and the relationships of caregiving are
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omissions liability to roommates or brothers, if they so choose. We are also
mindful that child-rearing values are too often used in the service of
discriminating against non-traditional groups and groupings.
Thus, at least two central differences with Hills are worth highlighting.
First, we see family ties burdens as efforts to cope with and oversee
relationships in which people often find themselves vulnerable in intimate
contexts in which the state can perform little oversight, triggering the need,
perhaps, for substantial sanctions. Thus, we would not have criminal liabilities
contingent on whether anyone had kids, something that - the future of
humanity, notwithstanding - seems morally arbitrary to us, at least as far as the
criminal law is concerned. Second, even if we concede the view that the
perpetuation of our species and the acculturation of our citizens through private
resources is a central good that the state should pursue by propping up the
family and subsidizing its activities (and we make just that concession in all
our work),28 we are still committed to the view that there are certain liberal
norms that constrain how the state may choose to pursue such ends in the
criminal law. Our normative framework is poised to highlight that through
both our voluntariness inquiry as well as our minimalism inquiry. Without
some compelling proof that the state needs to use the criminal law to forward
its agenda of only allowing one man and/or one woman to raise a child, we
remain convinced that our account is more consistent with basic liberal
commitments, requiring only a minimal focus on whether the obligation of
care was voluntarily assumed. It still might be a bad use of resources to
criminalize this world of intimacy and inaction. Indeed, we are also more
libertarian than Hills, it seems, for he is more comfortable using the state
criminal law apparatus to promote child-rearing than we are to promote
relationships of caregiving; 29 but that is a separate question from our threshold
inquiry into whether a liberal state could create such crimes in the first place.
established voluntarily by the adults in the house, it seems arbitrary to us not to protect the
kids from the caregiving adults, once the criminal law is going to target this class of
omissions in the first place.
Likewise, Hills's "Truman Show" example, id., is misplaced. He might be right that a
for-profit corporation is not well-suited to the tasks of child-rearing. Nonetheless, it stands
in some tension with his toleration of traditional kibbutz-style child-rearing. See id. at 1433
n.31. Moreover, depending on the circumstances, we might very well vote for (or against)
laws preventing communal or corporate caregiving. But regardless of our preferences on
that matter, we see no problem in wanting to hold responsible that unit or its managing
members for failures to protect the vulnerable child under its care.
28 See Collins, Leib & Markel, supra note 1, at 1355-56; Dan Markel, Jennifer M.
Collins & Ethan J. Leib, Criminal Justice and the Challenge of Family Ties, 2007 U. ILL. L.
REv. 1147, 1187-88.
29 Hills, supra note 1, at 1431.
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II. ON THE PURPOSES OF CLEANSING
A different objection to our project rests on the concern that we appear to
premise the argument on the ability of the criminal law to structure people's
conduct within their relationships effectively. If a parent does not feel
sufficiently motivated to save his child in an easy rescue without criminal law
liability, can it really be true that the criminal law is going to give the parent
just the reason he needs to perform the rescue?30
We might ask the same question about virtually all malum in se criminal law
rules. But these rules exist because it is thought that in fact some people
forbear from misconduct because they do respond to these penalties and, in any
event, the wrongdoing warrants punishment. For conduct on the margins of
malum in se, however, we share some of Professors Hills's and O'Hear's
instincts on this matter: that in most cases of the sort we examine, the criminal
law is surely not the only or best way to engage in social engineering. For that
reason, among others, we broadly urge decriminalization of the family ties
burdens we found in all but one example (omissions liability). Can a criminal
rule help some vulnerable people on the margins? Quite possibly. And that
might be reason enough to create a criminal liability in a certain set of cases.
Of course, one would need to weigh the very substantial costs as well, costs
Professors Hills and O'Hear do an excellent job of specifying.
The notion that the criminal law is not a particularly effective deterrence
mechanism surely cannot end the discussion. For example, we do think it is
inevitable - and desirable - that legislators will continue to impose criminal
liability on certain family members who fail to behave responsibly in caring
for their relations. Assuming that premise to be true, we think there are a few
important things that can be accomplished by "cleansing" the criminal law
from relying exclusively on the status of the traditional family. 31
30 See generally Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A
Behavioral Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173 (2004) (providing a set of
reasons for skepticism toward the possibility of successful deterrence strategy through
criminal law).
31 We are hopeful that we do not get characterized in the future as desiring to "purg[e]"
the criminal law entirely of all references to the categories of "parent" and "spouse." See
Hills, supra note 1, at 1427. Although Professor Hills makes that charge and suggests that
we seek to "eliminate reference to these categories," id. at 1428, in fact we use those
categories to create presumptions of burdens in the omissions liability context. See Collins,
Leib & Markel, supra note 1, at 1373-74. Our effort to "cleanse" the law is only a response
to the unnecessary reliance upon these categories to exclude other relationships of voluntary
caregiving. Hills suggests enlarging the definition of parent and spouse, see Hills, supra
note 1, at 1428, whereas we suggest focusing on the underlying characteristics of the
relationship in deciding whether liability is appropriate without regard to forcing those
relationships into definitional pigeonholes. See Collins, Leib & Markel, supra note 1, at
1372-73. To our mind, it is the nature and quality of the relationship that matters, rather
than the label we attach to it.
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First, as we observed earlier, there are many non-traditional families that
trigger the same vulnerabilities that present themselves within the traditional
family structure. 32 To the extent the criminal law is designed to punish
wrongdoing against the vulnerable, there is no special reason to limit the
application of that retributive function only to those in traditional family
relationships - and the wrongdoing is certainly no less wrong outside
traditional families. Thus, expanding liability to those in non-traditional
relationships of voluntary caregiving may both vindicate the interests of a
wider class of vulnerable individuals and send the message that the persons in
those non-traditional relationships are worthy of our respect and consideration.
After all, the purpose of the criminal law is not limited only to incentivizing
individuals to behave appropriately and responsibly. Let us use the
paradigmatic case of the parent-child relationship as an example. We would
surely like to believe that all parents are primarily devoted to promoting their
children's well-being and thus will "do right" by their children without the
intervention of the criminal law. But the prevalence of child abuse and neglect
in our society shows this assumption is untrue. 33 Some subset of parents will
undoubtedly fail their children. In those cases where we impose punishment,
we are grappling with whether the imposition of that punishment should be
limited to those in traditional, most often biological, parent-child relationships.
We conclude that it should not.
We concede, however, that if the criminal law's only function were
deterrence, we are almost as skeptical as Professor O'Hear (and perhaps more
skeptical than Professor Hills) that these laws could decisively structure ex
ante behavior directly.34 There is something else, however, that might be
gleaned from Professor O'Hear's citation to the work of Professors Robinson
and Darley. 35 Even if their conclusions are right that doctrinal manipulation
does not really deter in quite the simplistic way some have presumed, their
work might support a different sort of argument that could be useful to our
positions: to the extent that we are aiming to capture a class of wrongdoers
who appear to the public to deserve punishment rather than a more arbitrary
We are content to accept Professor Hills's friendly amendment that we seek to "reform
the concepts [of parent and spouse] in every part of the law rather than adopt the halfway
measure of merely reforming the criminal code" in the future. Hills, supra note 1, at 1428.
But we have not undertaken the ambitious task of reforming "every part of the law" here;
we only seek to reform a very small class of crimes, which struck us as especially
problematic because familial status is being used to allocate criminal liability.
32 See supra Part I.
33 See Jennifer M. Collins, Crime and Parenthood: The Uneasy Case for Prosecuting
Negligent Parents, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 807, 808 (2006); Jennifer M. Collins, Lady
Madonna, Children at Your Feet: The Criminal Justice System's Romanticization of the
Parent-Child Relationship, 93 IOWA L. REv. 131, 133 (2007).
3' Hills, supra note 1, at 1429; O'Hear, supra note 1, at 1446-47.
31 O'Hear, supra note 1, at 1446 n.22 (citing Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The
Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 453, 458-63 (1997)).
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group drawn through status, our regime is more likely to inspire general
compliance with the law.36
This inference actually ties into the view that there is an "expressive"
interest in cleansing the criminal law of its focus on the state-sanctioned
family. 37 Although we do not think it will be of great emotional benefit to
same-sex partners or polyamorous groups that they may sign up on some odd
registry to symbolize to the world they have taken on certain duties, we do
think the criminal law has to be designed in a way that does not project that
morally arbitrary status differences alone are a sufficient basis for criminal law
liability. Professor O'Hear may be right (though we doubt it) that we can read
the law's failure to criminalize failures to rescue in same-sex contexts as a
testimony to the law's faith that same-sex partners will always save their
dependents. 38 But without evidence that this distinction in treatment is rational
or motivated by something other than discrimination, we think there is good
reason to design a system that does not allow these distinctions in status. That
could be accomplished by decriminalization or broadening the category of who
can be held liable.
Professor O'Hear is right to focus on the consequences of broadening the
categories of liability: we may achieve only a pyrrhic victory if we get the law
to be more equal on its face only to discover that implementation practices of
line prosecutors are discriminatory. 39 And then look what we would have
accomplished: we would have used discrimination against gays as an excuse to
create a new vehicle for discrimination against gays. This time, however, the
discrimination will be much harder to spot, will be much tougher to oppose
because the decisions made by prosecutors are essentially unreviewable, and
may actually send gays to prison rather than just giving them a cause for
dignitary harm. Some accomplishment indeed!
Professor O'Hear's arguments on this point are hard to dispute. But that is
in part because they rely on speculation about how things will proceed once
our arguments are accepted. 40 Although we have no basis for speculation
36 See Robinson & Darley, supra note 35, at 497-98 (arguing that harmonizing law and
social norms can help secure compliance - and that gaps between law and norms can breed
resistance).
37 Thus, pace Professor O'Hear, supra note 1, at 1446-47, we are not committed to the
view that participation in the registry system itself will have meaningful positive expressive
value (though it may); we are much more concerned about the negative expressive value of
the system as it is.
38 See id. at 1446 n.21.
39 Id. at 1445.
40 Some of the doomsday scenarios offered by the replies do have empirical support.
Both Professors Hills and O'Hear cite the example of domestic violence "no-drop" policies,
which might have the perverse consequence of making victims less likely to collaborate
with law enforcement to stop the abuse, precisely because they do not really want the
criminal law sanctions that would follow from reporting incidents of abuse. See Hills, supra
note 1, at 1426; O'Hear, supra note 1, at 1447. The same dynamic might ensue in our
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otherwise (other than a sense that the small contribution our program might
make to nondiscrimination norms might usefully counterbalance the
speculative costs associated therewith), we would hope that legislators would
study evidence related to O'Hear's warnings if and when they revisit these
laws to consider our views. States can experiment with the possible regimes
we sketch for a short time to see how they play out; they can delay applying
them until there is satisfaction that the new laws would be enforced in
nondiscriminatory ways; they can create ways of overseeing enforcement; or
they can opt for simple decriminalization owing to these practical concerns, a
point we examine next.
III. ON MINIMALISM
Finally, underlying at least Professor O'Hear's commentary is the
suggestion that we are not libertarian enough for his tastes.41 He notes that we
talk big about "minimalism" but are ultimately sanguine about expanding the
reach of the criminal law, identifying new potential defendants and scooping
them up into the current laws, which presently target a much smaller class of
offenders. 42 He tells us that civil law will be enough if it is necessary at all. 43
To our mind, this critique seems off the mark. As stated at the outset of this
Response, we generally endorse decriminalization in all but the omissions
context; and, indeed, O'Hear does not seem highly motivated to decriminalize
completely in that context either.44  In light of his commitment to
nondiscrimination, we hope he would agree to put aside his libertarian instincts
for a moment to make sure the law treats all caregivers equally.
Accordingly, it seems that our ultimate conclusions on most of the family
ties burdens are perfectly consistent with Professor O'Hear's preferences.
Indeed, we are hopeful that our "speed-bumps" - as we call them in the article
- will generally slow down the criminalization process. One should keep in
mind our intended audience for the normative framework: legislators who may
have quite different instincts on how libertarian they are willing to be but who
are nonetheless committed to autonomy, nondiscrimination, and protection of
the vulnerable.
regime: the vulnerable will get no more protection because criminalization will deter the
abused's cooperation with law enforcement. Surely, we agree with Professors Hills and
O'Hear that legislators must make practical calculations about the likely consequences of
any particular criminal law. See Hills, supra note 1, at 1434-35; O'Hear, supra note 1, at
1446-47. That is part of our minimalism inquiry, and their arguments on this issue are
admissible to the legislators making these laws.
41 See O'Hear, supra note 1, at 1439.
42 Id.
41 We note that Professor O'Hear did not much defend decriminalization in the contexts
of incest, bigamy, or adultery, crimes that might follow from his suggested alternative
reasons for liability based on vulnerability and proximity. See id. at 1443.
44 See id.
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In short, in many cases, we would prefer - and have stated our preference
for - full-scale decriminalization. Yet we are willing to tolerate some
expansion of criminal duties if legislators can meet the burden of extending
them equally in good faith and explaining why lesser sanctions are inadequate
to achieve the underlying good the law is intending to accomplish. We
nevertheless hope those very same legislators also pay careful attention to the
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